Editörial Ortağımız SWP kaynaklı analiz · YeniSesler.tr · 4 Eylül 2018

On 15 July 2016, factions within the Turkish military attempted to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the government. The coup failed thanks to public resistance, opposition from political leadership, and divisions within the army itself. Yet for Erdoğan, the failed putsch became a defining political opportunity — one he used to launch sweeping purges across the state apparatus and to fundamentally restructure Turkey’s political system.

State of emergency: purges and institutional overhaul

Parliament approved a state of emergency on 21 July 2016, which remained in force until mid-July 2018. Under its umbrella, Erdoğan issued 32 emergency decrees that reshaped the state. Around 130,000 public-sector employees were dismissed. By the end of 2016, approximately 125,000 people had been arrested, with 36,000–40,000 placed in pre-trial detention — including 149 journalists. By the end of 2022, the total number of arrests and detentions linked to the coup attempt had climbed to roughly 332,000, and 4,000 judges and prosecutors lost their posts .

Thousands of private schools, universities, and foundations were shuttered by decree. A further 131 media companies were closed, including 45 newspapers, 16 television stations, 23 radio stations, and 3 news agencies. Passports of tens of thousands of people were revoked .

Freedom House, in its 2017 country report, documented the scale of the crackdown independently: over 150,000 soldiers, judges, police, civil servants, academics, and teachers were detained or dismissed for alleged loyalties to the Gülen movement, Kurdish militants, or other perceived anti-government forces, while scores of media outlets and hundreds of civic organizations were closed .

The resulting climate of fear significantly restricted political competition and public debate, creating the conditions for a deeper restructuring of Turkey’s institutions.

The 2017 referendum and the presidential system

The decisive step came with the constitutional referendum of April 2017, in which a narrow majority voted to introduce a presidential system that vastly expanded the president’s powers. International election observers reported irregularities and concluded that the referendum was not free or fair. The legitimacy of the result remained controversial — not least because the Supreme Electoral Committee acknowledged around two million improperly stamped ballots on election night, tipping the vote to a narrow victory .

The constitutional amendment concentrated executive power in the hands of the president, granting him extensive appointment authority while restricting Parliament’s oversight and veto rights. Judicial independence weakened as executive influence grew. While political scientists initially classified Turkey as a “competitive authoritarian” regime, more recent analyses increasingly describe it as an outright “autocracy” .

International governance indices track this trajectory clearly. Turkey’s score in the Liberal Democracy Index nearly halved within a few years. In 2018, Freedom House downgraded Turkey from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” — a status it has not recovered . The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has likewise shown significant deficits in the rule of law and judicial independence since the state of emergency .

The economic price of autocratisation

Autocratisation has been accompanied by a steady erosion of the institutional framework underpinning the Turkish economy. The weakening of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and property-rights protections — together with the loss of central bank independence — deepened uncertainty over economic policy. Growing concentration of power and the dismantling of institutional checks made policy increasingly unpredictable, a trend reflected in key indicators that pointed to a marked slowdown from 2016 onward .

In the first five years after the coup attempt, average annual real GDP growth fell from 6.5 percent in the preceding five-year period to 3.5 percent, despite expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Nominal GDP per capita dropped from around $11,000 to $9,700. Foreign direct investment inflows declined from an average of $15 billion to $11 billion. Export growth slowed from 5 to 3 percent, while inflation rose from 7 to 14 percent. The Turkish lira depreciated sharply and became markedly more volatile .

External assessments echo this picture. An IMF Article IV consultation report noted that the failed coup heightened political uncertainty, weakened investment, and slowed credit growth, while the central bank was forced into volatile rate adjustments to defend a faltering lira .

No recovery in sight

There are currently no signs of a sustained economic recovery. Ongoing repression against the opposition party CHP and its mayors, combined with the government’s renewed efforts to amend the constitution to secure its hold on power, are deepening political instability and weighing on the investment climate. As Freedom House notes, the AKP has responded to economic challenges and municipal election defeats by intensifying its suppression of dissent and imprisonment of opposition politicians .

A decade on from the coup attempt, the trajectory is clear: the consolidation of executive power has come at the cost of the rule of law, democratic competition, and economic stability. Whether Turkey can reverse course depends less on economic policy than on whether the institutional checks that once constrained government action can be rebuilt.

Kaynaklar / References

  1. Aydın, Y. (2026). The failed coup and Turkey’s path towards autocracy. SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).
  2. Freedom House. (2026). Turkey: Freedom in the World 2026 Country Report.
  3. Freedom House. (2017). Turkey: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report.
  4. International Monetary Fund. (2016). Turkey: 2017 Article IV Consultation — Staff Report. Country Report No. 17/32.